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TAXATION OF PAYMENTS TO MEDICAL
INTERNS AND RESIDENTS
Hembree v. United States,
464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972)
Hembree, after receiving his doctor of medicine degree in 1966,
served his internship and pursued his residency on a rotation schedule
among three hospitals.' These hospitals provided him with stipends
from which they withheld federal income taxes. Hembree sued for a
refund, claiming the stipends qualified as fellowship grants excludable
from gross income.2 The district court granted the refund only as to
the stipend from one of the hospitals, on the theory that this hospi-
tal's primary purpose was training doctors and, therefore, payments
made by it to interns and residents were excludable. 3 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held: all the stipends rep-
resented compensation for services performed and, therefore, could not
be excluded as a fellowship grant.4
Under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code scholarship and fellowship
funds were excludable from the recipient's gross income only if they
qualified as gifts.5 In the 1954 Code, Congress changed the treat-
1. The rotation program involved three hospitals: The Medical College of South
Carolina Hospital, The Veterans Administration Hospital, and the Charleston County
Hospital. Fringe benefits included uniforms, laundry services, group health insurance
and two weeks leave after a year of service. Hembree v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 87,518 (D.S.C. 1971).
2. IrT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 117(a):
(a) General Rule-in the case of an individual, gross income does not in-
clude...
(1) any amount received...
(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution . . . or,
(B) as a fellowship grant ....
3. The district court decision was based on the determination that the primary
purpose of the Medical College of South Carolina Hospital was training doctors. In
support of this conclusion the court looked to the charter of the hospital, as well as to
the legislative act which authorized the acquisition of the land for the hospital. Both
the charter and the act emphasized that the hospital was to be a teaching hospital.
See Hembree v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,518 (D.S.C. 1971).
4. Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972).
5. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 22(b)(3):
(b) Exclusions from Gross Income-the following items shall not be in-
cluded in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this
chapter:
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ment of scholarships and fellowships6 and provided a separate section
to cover those funds.' The 1954 Code did not, however, specify
what funds were included under the section. To fill this definitional
void, the Treasury Department promulgated regulations.8
(3) Gifts, Bequests, and Devises-The value of property acquired by
gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance....
A 1951 revenue ruling stated that, if a scholarship or fellowship furthered the training
and education of an individual, it could be considered a gift. I.T. 4056, 1951-2 CuM.
BULL. 8 (declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 69-43, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 310). Although
the word "gift" is a generic term, it refers specifically to the receipt of financial ad-
vantages gratuitously given, or to the voluntary transfer of property without considera-
tion as defined in § 22(b)(3) of the 1939 Code. See 47 CJ.S. Internal Revenue
§ 112 (1946). For cases applying the gift test under the 1939 Code, see note 15 infra.
6. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954). Both reports emphasize a desire to eliminate the con-
fusion and case-by-case determinations that had resulted from placing scholarships
and fellowships under the gift section. For a pre-1954 case, see Banks v. Commissioner,
17 I.C, 1386 (1952).
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 117(a). For a general discussion of the effect of
the adoption of § 117, see Chommie, Services Rendered, Not Donative Intent, Governs
Exemption of Study Grants, 4 J. TAx. 375 (1956); Gordon, Scholarships and Fellowship
Grants as Income: A Search for Treasury Policy, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 144.
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(c) (1956):
(c) Fellowship grants. A fellowship grant generally means an amount paid
or allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the pur-
suit of study or research .
Treas. Reg. § 1.1174 (1956):
The following payments or allowances shall not be considered to be amounts
received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117:
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the bene-
fit of the grantor.
(1) . . . any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an indi-
vidual to enable him to pursue studies or research, if such
amount represents either compensation for past, present, or fu-
ture employment services or represents payment for services
which are subject to the direction or supervision of the grantor.
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual
to enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the
benefit of the grantor. However, amounts paid or allowed to,
or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies
or research are considered to be amounts received as a scholar-
ship or fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117 if the
primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the edu-
cation and training of the recipient in his individual capacity
and the amount provided by the grantor for such purpose does
not represent compensation or payment for the services described
in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. Neither the fact that
the recipient is required to furnish reports of his progress to
the grantor, nor the fact that the results of his studies or research
may be of some incidental benefit to the grantor shall, of itself,
be considered to destroy the essential character of such amount
as a scholarship or fellowship grant.
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Initially, courts utilized the definition of a fellowship contained
in section 1.117-4(c)(2) of the Treasury Regulations to determine
whether a payment qualified for exclusion, developing what became
known as the primary purpose test.9 In Reese v. Commissioner the
court stated:
The primary purpose test requires a determination of the raison d'&re
of the payment. . . . Obviously such a determination depends upon
whose purpose is adopted as the standard of measurement. Often more
than a single purpose is involved.',
One variation of the primary purpose test emphasized the primary op-
erational purpose of the institution making the payment rather than
the purpose of the particular payment," and it was this variation
which the lower court applied to the payments made to Hembree.
In Bingler v. Johnson,'" the first Supreme Court decision
interpreting Treasury Regulation 1.117-4(c), the Court shifted the
emphasis from section 1.117-4(c)(2), the section from which the pri-
mary purpose test was extracted, to section 1.117-4(c)(1). 13  The
For the source of the Treasury Department's authority to promulgate regulations, see
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7805(a).
9. In Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961), an employee of a
state welfare department was given an educational leave of absence to obtain a mas-
ter's degree in sociology. The employee received her previous salary, payments for
educational expenses, and fringe benefits. The leave of absence stipulated that the
employee work for the department twelve months for every year of schooling and that
the purpose of the grant was to improve the efficiency of the department. The court
held that the payments were not excludable since they were primarily for the benefit
of the grantor. In Reese v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 407 (1966), aff'd per curiam,
373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967), taxpayer was a candidate for a master of arts degree in
teaching and was required to teach for one semester with full classroom responsibility.
The court held that she received income. See also Reiffen v. United States, 372
F.2d 883 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
10. Reese v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 407, 410-11 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d
742 (4th Cir. 1967).
11. See Wrobleski v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958). In finding the
payments excludable, the court concentrated its attention on the overall purpose and
function of the institution: "The essential business of the Institution, however, is not
the care and treatment of patients." Id. at 904.
12. 394 U.S. 741 (1969). In this case, Westinghouse granted three employees an
educational leave of absence so that they could attend class full time to obtain their
doctorates. The employees received from seventy to ninety percent of their salaries,
retained seniority status and employee benefits, and agreed to return to Westinghouse
for two additional years after their leaves of absence.
13. The shift in emphasis is important because Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(1) re-
quires a determination whether "such amount represents the compensation for past,
present, or future employment services" and contains none of the language of Treas.Washington University Open Scholarship
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question presented was whether payments to employees on an educa-
tional leave of absence qualified as fellowships. In deciding that the
payments did not qualify, the Court stated:
The thrust of the provision [Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(1)] dealing with
compensation is that bargained-for payments, given only as a quo in
return for the quid of services rendered-whether past, present, or
future-should not be excludable from income as "scholarship" funds.14
The essential issue of this test is whether payment is given in return
for services. Courts utilized the same test under the 1939 Code to
determine whether such a payment was a gift and thus an excludable
fellowship. 15 The quid pro quo test has been applied in most medical
Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2), which requires a determination of the primary purpose of the
grantor institution in making the grant. See note 8 supra.
14. 394 U.S. at 757. The Court accepted the government's argument that Treas.
Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2) (1956) was merely an adjunct to Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(1)
(1956). Id. at 758 n.32. Since § 1.117-4(c)(2) was the source of the primary pur-
pose test, the Court implied that it was only of secondary importance to the quid pro
quo test. The quid pro quo test is identical to the "indicia of compensation" test, de-
veloped by some lower federal courts, which focuses on whether the characteristics of
the payments were those typically associated with compensation. See Stewart v.
United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966); Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721
(10th Cir. 1963); Evans v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 720 (1960); 31 Osno ST. L. REV.
186, 191-92 (1970). Woddail and Evans actually contained language referring to both
the primary purpose and indicia of compensation test. See, e.g., Woddail v. Com-
missioner, 321 F.2d 721, 724 (10th Cir. 1963). Generally, regardless of the test em-
ployed, courts held that if the grantor was not the employer of the grantee, payments
could be excluded. If the grantee was not fully trained, his case for exclusion was also
good. This latter generalization could not be applied to interns and residents, how-
ever. See IA MERTENS, LAW OF FFDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.42, at 153 (rev.
vol. 1969).
15. For the basic statement of the gift test, see Robertson v. United States, 343
U.S. 711, 713-14 (1952): "The discharge of legal obligations-the payment for services
rendered or consideration paid pursuant to a contract-is in no sense a gift." For a
case applying this test to scholarships and fellowships, see George Winchester Stone,
Jr., 23 T.C. 254 (1954). The majority held that the "fellowship award was not paid
pursuant to a contract and was not a payment for services. It was a gift . . . ." Id.
at 265. The dissent argued that "the performance of the services or the doing of the
work agreed upon was a prerequisite, or the quid pro quo, for the money received."
Id. Though the crucial issue in the gift test was whether the payments were compensa-
tion for services, the majority also spoke of the intent of the payor in determining the
issue. Id. at 259. For other cases applying the gift test to scholarships, see Ti Li Loo,
22 T.C. 220 (1954); Ephraim Banks & Libby K. Banks, 17 T.C. 1386 (1952). See
also Tabac, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants: An Administration Merry-Go-Round,
46 TAxEs 485, 493 (1968); 19 Burr. L. REv. 441, 447 (1970).
Though the branch of the primary purpose test which emphasizes the raison d'9tre
of the payment might permit exclusion of payments which have some characteristics
of compensation by attempting to examine the subjective purpose of the payor, courts
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/14
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intern and resident cases since Bingler, and courts have generally held
that the payments represent compensation for services. 10
In Hembree, the district court considered the primary purpose of
each hospital's operation as the valid criterion for determining ex-
clusion,"' and concluded the payments were excludable. The appel-
late court, however, held the lower court's interpretation of the pri-
mary purpose test erroneous in that the interpretation ignored the
primary purpose of the payment to the taxpayer. Considering only
this purpose, the court found that the teaching hospital paid Hem-
bree because he had provided services which were of benefit to it.' 8
The court stated that an even more compelling reason for its decision
was that under the quid pro quo test the payments represented com-
pensation since Hembree had performed valuable employment serv-
ices and all the indicia of an employer-employee relationship existed."0
utilizing this test have denied exclusion if the payments were made by the employer of
the taxpayer. See Littman v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 503 (1964); Sweet v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959); 19 BuFF. L. REv. 441, 447 (1970). But see Leathers v.
United States, CCH 1973 STAND. FED. Tx REP. U.S. TAx CAS. (73-1, at 80,116)
9139 (8th Cir. December 20, 1972).
16. Rundell v. Commissioner, 455 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1972); Wertzberger v. United
States, 441 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1971). In Tobin v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 239
(S.D. Tex. 1971), the court looked upon all payments given to Tobin as compensation
even though he spent three months in the program with virtually no patient responsi-
bility. In Kwass v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 186, 188 (E.D. Mich. 1970), the court
stated:
In the case at bar there was indeed the requisite quid pro quo from the resi-
dent doctors. For the University Hospital was receiving substantial serv-
ices from them in exchange for the salaries paid.
In Quast v. United States, 428 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1970), a career medical resident was
paid more than the usual resident, and he contracted to remain at the hospital longer
than the usual resident. His contract contained the word "employment" several
times, and he held an Associate Grade classification under the Veterans Administration.
He amended his complaint, stating that the part of his salary which a regular resident
received should be excluded under section 117. The court rejected this theory. Cf.
Shuff v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Va. 1971). Petitioner was a resident
in hospital administration; he was not a doctor. Since the stated purpose of the pro-
gram was strictly educational and since residents in the program primarily observed
and performed little, if any, service for the hospital, the court found that the payment
did not represent compensation for services.
17. Hembree v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,518 (D.S.C. 1971).
18. Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972).
19. Id. at 1264. Courts which have discussed both the primary purpose test and
the indicia of compensation (quid pro quo) test have failed to make clear the rela-
tionship between the two. See Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir.
1972); Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Evans v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C. 720 (1960).
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1973:2281 MEDICAL INTERNS AND RESIDENTS
Hembree leaves little doubt that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
will utilize the quid pro quo test in determining whether payments to
interns and residents should be excluded under section 117. By
adopting the quid pro quo test, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has determined that it will look no further into the purposes
of the payment once an employer-employee relationship has been es-
tablished. Such a mechanical application of the quid pro quo or pri-
mary purpose tests renders the actual motivation of the payor irrele-
vant. Consequently, residents and interns are effectively precluded
from qualifying for exclusion of payments from income under section
117. On the other hand, a recent decision from the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, in allowing payments to residents to be ex-
cluded from income, allowed consideration by a jury of further evi-
dence on the actual motivation of the payor hospital.2"
Congress attempted to delete the gift test by enacting section 117.21
However, as long as courts apply Treasury Regulation 1.117-4(c) in a
mechanical fashion, whether it be in the guise of the primary purpose
of the payment test or the quid pro quo test, this congressional in-
tent will not be realized. The resultant gift tests will persist, denying
fellowship exclusions to interns and residents even though the services
for which they are paid are an essential part of the training required
for the completion of their medical education.2 2
20. Leathers v. United States, CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS.
(73-1, at 80,116) 9139 (8th Cir. December 20, 1972). Significantly, the court of
appeals refused to reverse the district court in admitting evidence on the educational
purpose of the payor institution. But while the district court in Hembree used the
evidence of the purpose of the institution's existence as a conclusive test on exclusion,
the district court in Leathers allowed the evidence as merely further indication of the
actual motivation of the payor. See id. at 80,121 n.1 (Lay, J., concurring). But see id.
at 80.116, 80,125 (Bright, J., dissenting) (emphasis original), citing Hembree v. United
States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972):
I am satisfied that where an employment relationship exists between an edu-
cational institution and a student, the motives of each do not become crucial
in determining the tax status of the payments made by the school.
21. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954).
22. Several commentators have pointed out that the primary purpose test is not
found in the 1954 Code and that legislative history does not warrant its adoption.
See I A. MERTENS, LA-w OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION § 7.42, at 148 (rev. vol. 1969);
Tabac, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants: An Administrative Merry-Go-Round, 46
TAxEs 485, 493 (1968); 19 BUFF. L. Rlv. 441, 447 (1970). In Brief for Appellee at
18, Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972), it is stated:
The distinguishing feature between the training of physicians and the training
of historians and the like, is, of course, that medicine is an applied science,
233
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which can only be learned by its application. It is doubtful that anyone
would seriously contend that the trial and error method be employed in the
training of physicians, or that a physician can obtain training solely from at-
tendance of lectures and through reading textbooks. Obviously, that which
is learned in the classroom must be applied and in the application thereof
medical services necessarily are performed, but only incidentally to the pri-
mary purpose of training.
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